The Treasury Interprets the Clifford Case by Lynch, Joseph B.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 2 Article 1 
1946 
The Treasury Interprets the Clifford Case 
Joseph B. Lynch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph B. Lynch, The Treasury Interprets the Clifford Case, 15 Fordham L. Rev. 161 (1946). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol15/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XV NOVEMBER, 1946 NUMBER 2
THE TREASURY INTERPRETS THE CLIFFORD CASE
JOSEPH B. LYNCH-
THE Clifford case,1 a hardy perennial, is again in bloom. Analyzed,
criticized or cited in more than two hundred decisions over a six-
year period, it has already caused such confusion in the determination
of whether income of certain trusts is taxable to the grantor or to the
beneficiary, as to become the despair of both bench and bar.
In 1945, Roswell Magill proposed a resolution of the uncertainties
by statutory amendments which would contemplate the following
results:
"1. If the income of the trust is in fact used to discharge the settlor's
pecuniary obligations, the settlor shall be taxable on the income
so used.
2. If the settlor retains the power to add or subtract beneficiaries,
he shall be taxable on the income subject to such power.
3. The income of trusts having a term-of five years or less (after
which the corpus is to revert to the settlor) shall be taxed to the
settlor.
4. The fact that the settlor, or an individual or institution of his
choice is trustee, shall not render the settlor taxable upon the
trust income.
5. The fact that the settlor retains the power to direct trust invest-
ments or to vote corporate stock held by the trustee shall not
render him taxable on the trust income."2
The Clifford principle as stated by the Treasury is that a grantor
of a trust is taxable under Sec. 22(a) 3 if he has retained "a control bf
' Member of the New York Bar.
In this article the following abbreviated citations will be used: Decisions of the Board
of Tax Appeals will be cited as B. T. A. Decisions of the Tax Court (formerly Board
of Tax Appeals) will be cited as T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. refers to docket number of a
Memorandum Opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals or the Tax Court.- Acquiescence of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals or the
Tax Court will be cited as A. Non-acquiescence will be cited as N. A. Internal Revenue
Bulletins will be cited as I. R. B. Cumulative Bulletins of the Internal Revenue Bureau
will be cited as C. B. Internal Revenue Code will be cited as I. R. C. and Treasury Deci-
sions will be cited as T. D.
1. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
2. Magill, What Shall Be Done with the Clifford Case? (1945) 45 COL. L. REv. 111, 127.
3. I. R. C. Sec. 22(a) includes among "gross income" all "... gains, profits, and income
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the trust so complete that he is still in practical effect the owner of its
income." Recognizing that the application of this principle "to varying
and diversified factual situations" has led to considerable uncertainty,
the Treasury has now set down specific norms by which in its judgment
the doctrine is to be applied.4 While the purpose of Mr. Magill's article
was to analyze and evaluate the Clifford decision and the cases stem-
ming from it, the primary purpose of this paper is to make an examina-
tion and appraisal of the Treasury's interpretation of the decision with
a view to indicating the extent to which it has judicial support.
It will be recalled that Clifford had set up a trust for his wife for a
period of five years, following which the principal was to revert to him,
and that if he died within that period the trust was to terminate and
the principal to pass to his estate; that he had the right to pay over
to his wife all or any part of the net income as he "in his 'absolute
discretion' might determine", but that any income not distributed to her
became hers upon the trust's termination, and that as sole trustee he
had quite normal powers of administrative control-power to vote stocks
held in trust, to sell, mortgage or pledge the trust assets, to make invest-
ments and to retain the assets in his own name. Noting three factors,
the shortness of the trust term, the intimacy of the family relationship
between the grantor-husband and the beneficiary-wife, and the control
over the trust which the former retained, and stressing and amplifying
the last two considerations, the Court held Clifford to be in substance
the owner of the trust property, and, as such, taxable on its income.
By the decision, the Commissioner was invited to fare forth and
attack with "all considerations and circumstances of the kind we have
mentioned", and the taxpayer was warned that he was defenseless if
his only armor consisted of "niceties of the law of trusts or convey-
ances", or "legal paraphernalia". Just when all such considerations
and circumstances added up to an effective weapon, and at what point
legal rights deteriorated into legal paraphernalia was an intriguing
problem left to future adjudication. The Court admonished that no
one fact was normally decisive. That a melee of vexatious litigation
would ensue should have surprised no one. There was no definite yard-
stick, no fixed standard. On the contrary, the Court noted the failure
derived . . . from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings
in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest
in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived, from any
source whatever . . ." Sec. 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, under which the Clifford case
was decided, contained an identical provision.
4. T. D. 5488, I. R. B. 1946-2-12210, amending Treasury Regulations 111.
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of Congress to provide a "rule of thumb", and this was indeed a failure,
presupposing that the judicial interpretation of Sec. 22(a) in relation
to trust income accurately reflected Congressional intent. Later cases
made reference to "the process of repeated adjudications" consequent
upon "the absence of legislative rule",' and to a solution of the difficulty
"by statute or treasury regulation".6 Again,, the wish was expressed that
the Clifford case could be advanced from "the doctrinal state in which
the matter has been left by the Supreme Court" to a field with "some
definite monuments". 7 Perhaps the most discouraging view of all was
that taken by the Second Circuit when it characterized the decision
as the
"starting point of a fertile proliferation, out of which no definite doctrine
has emerged, or in the nature of things could emerge." 8
Surely, these were broad hints to Congress and the Treasury to come
forward with something specific. Hence, in the absence of Congressional
action, the Treasury is to be commended for undertaking the task. It
was an exacting one. An extremely narrow construction would adversely
affect the public revenue, while an unduly broad construction would
sow the seeds of still further litigation. As was stated by the Treasury's
Assistant Tax Legislative Counsel prior to the publication of T. D. 5488,
the "lines drawn should not represent minimum effects from the Com-
missioner's point of view, nor should the Bureau seek to grasp each last
ounce of revenue." 9 That the Treasury has achieved the middle-of-the-
road desideratum not all will agree.
The three general factors which the Treasury considers determinative
of the question of taxability of trust income to the grantor under the
Clifford doctrine are retention of (1) reversionary interest effective
after a relatively short term, (2) power to dispose of beneficial enjoy-
ment of corpus or income, and (3) power of administrative control
exercisable primarily for the grantor's benefit."0 Before discussing these'
three major items in detail, it may be observed that several considera-
tions mentioned in the decided cases are not deemed by the Treasury
5. Helvering v. Stuart et al., 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
6. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941).
7. Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), cert. denied, 326
U. S. 719 (1945).
8. Hyman et at. v. Nunan, 143 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
9. De Wind, Trends Towards Clarity in the Clifford Case Problem, N. Y. U. FOuRTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDEA TAxATioN, (1946)-831, 845.
10. T. D. 5488 has no application to income from trusts received by divorced or




to be relevant to the issue, for example, the grantor's purpose of mini-
mizing taxes through the creation of a trust.11 Neither is the shortness
of the trust term a factor, unless coupled with a reversionary interest
in the grantor,"2 nor the circumstance that the grantor is a trustee,
unless certain powers are exercisable by him under stated conditions.
I
Reversionary Interest After Relatively Short Term
The Regulations provide that a grantor is taxable upon trust income
if he has a reversionary interest in the corpus or income which becomes
effective within 10 years of the date of the transfer to the trust. They
also hold the grantor taxable if he has such interest which becomes
effective within 15 years of such date and any one of three specified
power of administration is exercisable solely by the grantor, the spouse
living with the grantor, or both, whether or not as trustee. These powers
are (1) power to vote or direct the voting of stock or other securities,
(2). power directly or indirectly to control investments, and (3) power
to reacquire trust corpus. Of these, the first two are not abnormal
fiduciary powers. Hence, in a case in which the grantor or wife living
with him is the sole trustee, or in which both are the sole trustees, 'he
will normally be held taxable on the income if a reversionary interest
exists and the trust is to last less than 15 years. Even in the event
that there are additional trustees, it appears that the grantor will be
held taxable if he has reserved the right to remove them. 3 The pro-
vision with respect to a trust of less than 15 years' duration, unlike that
with respect to one of less than 10 years' duration, has no application
if the sole income beneficiaries are charities.
Short Term Trusts Lacking Family Beneficiary or Administrative
Control Factors. One of the stated bases of the Clifford decision was
"the fact that the wife was the beneficiary", and the Court, in developing
this point, indulged in such phrases as "a temporary reallocation of
11. Avoidance of taxes was mentioned by the Court as one of the purposes of the
Clifford trust, but, as pointed out in the Hyman case, there was no indication in the
opinion that taxpayer's motive was considered by the Court to be a factor relevant to
the result.
12. Cf. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69 (1940).
13. See Stockstrom et al., Trustees v. Commissioner, 151 F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945),
aff'g 4 T. C. 5, in which the Court adopted the language of the Tax Court opinion as follows:
"But she .. . reserved the right by amendment to the trust agreements to remove any
of the trustees and to name herself as trustee. We think that this reserved power gave
her as complete control over the action of the trustees and over the distribution of trust
income as if she herself had been the sole trustee." See also Standish Backus Est.,
6 T. C. -, No. 132 (May 19, 1946) A. 1946-17-12372.
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income within an intimate family group", "the normal consequences
of family solidarity", "household arrangements", the "intimacy of the
familial relationship" of grantor and beneficiary, and income which
"stays in the family group".
Another of the stated bases of the decision was Clifford's "retention
of control over the corpus". This concept was reiterated by statements
to the effect that Clifford's "control over investment remained", that
his "control over the corpus was in all essential respects the same after
the trust was created, as before", and that the "wide powers which he
retained included for all practical purposes most of the control which
he as an individual would have." Again, it was said that "the all-impor-
tant factor might be retention by him of control over the principal.
With that control in his hands he would keep direct command over
all that he needed to remain in substantially the same financial situation
as before."
Despite such rationalization, the Regulations flatly hold that, irre-
spective of the relationship of grantor to beneficiary, and irrespective
of whether he has retained any control over the corpus, every grantor
of a trust with a reversionary interest effective within 10 years is taxable
on the income. There would seem to be little room for doubt that the
scope of this provision is far beyond that of the Clifford opinion as
rendered. It remains for consideration, however, as to whether it is
outside the Clifford doctrine as subsequently extended by the courts.
In the Schaffner case,14 the Court said:
"Income which the donor gives away through the medium of a short term
trust created for the benefit of the donee is nevertheless income taxable to the
donor. Helvering v. Clifford, supra."
Is this statement a repudiation of the elaborate reasoning of the Clifford
opinion? Should it be interpreted to mean that absent the factor of
family beneficiary, and absent the factor of trust control, Clifford, never-
theless, would have been taxable on the trust income? It would appear
that such is the Treasury view. It was forecast by Mr. De Wind when
he stated:
"Logically, it must appear to make very little difference whether the bene-
ficiaries are members of the family group or not, particularly in view of the-
Schaffner cage."'15
The Schaffner case dealt, not with a short-term trust, but with a.
situation in which the donor assigned for a year a certain dollar amount
14. 312 U. S. 579 (1941).
15. De Wind, op. cit. supra note 9, at 840.
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of income from a trust. In holding the donor taxable, the Court reasoned
that the gift of a part of the trust income "for the period of a day, a
month or a year" involved no substantial disposition of the trust prop-
erty and was no different from the "gift of income in a specified amount
by the creation of a trust for a year". This dictum would seem to indi-
cate no more than a conviction that income from a trust of so short a
duration as a year is, without consideration of any other factor, taxable
to the grantor.
Hormel v. Helvering"6 and Helvering v. Richter 7 preceded the
Schaffner case by two weeks. In neither was the question of liability
under Sec. 22(a) specifically before the Court. Both related to short-
term trusts with reversionary interests in the grantors. The Hormel case
involved a 3-year trust of which the grantor and another were trustees.
The grantor and his wife, as guardians of their son, were the bene-
ficiaries, and were also vested with power to remove the co-trustee. The
Richter case dealt with a trust to terminate at the end of 5 years, but
which might have been terminated earlier upon consent of the wife
who was the income beneficiary. In both cases the Court indicated
that on the record the grantors were taxable under the Clifford rule.
Of the Richter case, Mr. De Wind states that it "comes fairly close to
saying that a short term is itself enough on which to predicate taxa-
bility"18 of the grantor. If, by "short term", Mr. De Wind had in mind
a 5-year term, it would seem that his view did not properly evaluate the
circumstance that the wife of the grantor in the Richter case was the
income beneficiary and hence that the Clifford case family-group factor
was also present.'9
The Second Circuit now holds that if the trust-control element is
present, the family-beneficiary factor is not essential to the taxability of
the grantor under the Clifford doctrine. In Commissioner v. Lamont,20
the donor of a successively extended 1-year trust was held taxable on the
income notwithstanding that charitable institutions as well as certain
individuals not closely related to the grantor were beneficiaries. Largely
influenced by the Schaffner decision, the Court rejected the theory of
distinguishing the Lamont case from the Clifford case on the ground
that in the former the beneficiaries were not members of the settlor's
16. 312 U. S. 552 (1941).
17. 312 U. S. 561 (1941).
18. De Wind, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 837.
19. It is possible that Mr. De Wind's view was predicated on the theory that the
provision for the wife's consent to such termination might be disregarded. and hence that
the trust was terminable by the grantor at any time. See note 41, infra, and accompany-
ing text.
20. 127 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
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family group, and even went so far as to case some doubt on the correct-
ness of its rule in the Achelis2' and Chamberlain2  cases, wherein the
grantors were held not taxable on the income of 4-year and 5-year trusts,
respectively, of each of which an educational organization was the in-
come beneficiary. In the Chamberlain case, the Court had said that
the trust there under consideration differed from both the Clifford and
Hormel trusts
"in that here no inter-family distribution of income was brought about to
satisfy the natural desires of the donor in that respect and gain for him what-
ever intangible benefit might flow therefrom."
However, the Court distinguished the Lamont from the Achelis and
Chamberlain cases by reference to the shorter term of the Lamont trust,
and by the circumstances that the grantor controlled the corpus through
a reservation of the right to substitute securities, and did in fact control
distribution among beneficiaries.
Nor is the rationale of the Lamont decision entirely consistent with
that of Helvering v. Elias' wherein the Court said of the Clifford
situation that
"the prime consideration is whether the income remains within the family." 24
In McKnight v. Commissioner,' the Eighth Circuit held taxable the
grantor of a trust of less than 3 years' duration which had been set up
for the benefit of his wife, notwithstanding that he had reserved no
direct control. The trustee, however, was a close friend and business
associate. The case was decided on the basis of the short-term and
family-beneficiary factors, and the indirect control which the grantor
retained through the trustee. The Court stated that under the Clifford
doctrine "the effectiveness of the short term family trust . . . has been
virtually destroyed". Obviously, if the grantor of a 3-year trust were
taxable on the income merely by reason of the brevity of the trust's term,
it were idle to discuss the family-beneficiary or indirect-control elements.
In Commissioner v. Wilson, 6 the Seventh Circuit was concerned with
a trust to continue for not more than two years for the benefit of a son.
21. Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940)
22. Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
23. 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert denied, 314 U S. 692 (1941).
24. See also Commissioner v. Wooley, 122 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied,
314 U. S. 693 (1941) in which the family-beneficiary doctrine of the Clifford case* was
applied to a nephew who, the Court said, "must be regarded as 'in the family' even
though he was not a member of the settlor's household."
25. 123 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
26. 125 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942). -
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Had it been the opinion of the Court that -the grantor was taxable solely
by reason of the 2-year term, it could readily have said so. Instead, it
rested its conclusion upon the Clifford doctrine which "holds that the
head of a family cannot affect his tax liability by allocating part of his
income to his wife through the medium of a short term trust over the
corpus of which he retains control."
In Helvering v. Bok,2r the Third Circuit, dealing with a 3-year trust,
dismissed the theory that a short-term trust, without more, renders the
income taxable to the donor, and distinguished the case under considera-
tion from the Lamont case on the ground that in the latter "the settlor
retained substantial control over investments since she could withdraw
and substitute securities."
In Central National Bank of Cleveland, Exr. v. Commissioner,2- the
Sixth Circuit also rejected "the view that the income of every short
term trust should be taxed to the settlor, as far beyond the Clifford
case, and those which followed it", noting:
"No case has been brought to our attention which expressly holds that a short
term trust of itself requires taxation of income to the donor."
In Hyman et al v. Nunan,9 the Second Circuit dealt with a case in
which the grantor conveyed property to herself and her husband as
trustees for the benefit of her minor son, the trust to last for twelve
years. She had the right to substitute any beneficiary except herself.
By reason of the combination of the shortness of the term and the reten-
tion of beneficial control, the Court held her taxable.3 ° Referring to the
Lamont case, the Court stated that it
"counted it the most important single factor that the settlor, although she
retained no legal power to change beneficiaries, was in such a relation to the
trustee that he would be almost certain to follow her wishes."
27. 132 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942).
28. 141 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944).
29. 143 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
30. In Commissioner v. Jonas, 122 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), the Court had
specifically stated that it had been ". . . referred to no decision taxing a settlor of a
trust as the owner of the income where the allocation of the income to the trust bene-
ficiaries has been for a period as long as ten years, where neither the settlor nor any member
of his family has been a trustee, and where no management of or control over the invest-
ments . . ." was retained. In Cory v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 642 (1942) the grantor of a 10-year trust, who had retained wide
administrative powers, was held taxable on the income, and in Commissioner v. Berolz-
heimer, 116 F. (2d) 628 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), the grantor of a less than 10-year trust who
had retained administrative powers was also held taxable. See also, United States v. Pierce,
137 F. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
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In view of the circumstance that the Lamont trust was to last for only
a year, this statement would seem to be proof positive that the Second
Circuit, even though it does not regard the family-beneficiary factor as
essential to a Clifford case, does not count the shortness, of the trust
term as of itself the determining factor.3'
In Commissioner v. Tower,32 the Supreme Court reiterated the rule
of'the Schaffner case that it is "the command of the taxpayer over the
income which is the concern of the tax laws", but the Court was applying
that comment to a situation in which, in a husband-wife partnership, the
"income produced by the husband's efforts continues to be used for the
same business and family purposes as before the partnership", and
again cited the Clifford case for the proposition that Sec. 22(a) "could
not be frustrated by family group arrangements".
Rabkin and Johnson 3 say that there is some support in prior deci-
sions for the Treasury Regulations holding taxable to the grantor income
of a trust which reverts to him within ten years "whether or not other
Clifford factors are present", and cite the Elias,34 Barbour" and PriceO6
cases. However, in the Elias case, as has been seen, the family-bene-
ficiary factor was present in that the income beneficiaries were the four
children of the grantor and in the Barbour case the income was payable
seven-tenths to the grantor's wife and children and three-tenths to
her mother, while in the Price case the beneficiary was an adopted
daughter, held by the Court to be "within an intimate family group".
Thus, the family-beneficiary element was not lacking in any of the
three cases.
From the decided cases, it is reasonable to deduce that the grantor of
a trust with reversionary interest effective after a short term may be
31. In Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), the same Court
had said of the Clifford decision that it "... did not suggest that the settlor of a trust
could not so completely sever himself from the income of property, for a period-even a
short period-as to make it no longer his." It may be noted that in Amory S. Carhart,
Memo. Op., Dkt. No. 6643 (June 20, 1946), the Tax Court held taxable the grantor of
two trusts of less than nine and fourteen years duration, respectively, commenting: "When
a grantor has retained the reversion, as he did here, but the term of the trust is compara-
tively short, the retention of administrative* control by the grantor is not a requisite of
its taxability." This statement, however, is merely dictum since in addition to the short-
ness of the trusts' terms there were present the family beneficiary and administrative
control factors, and the decision rested on all of these.
32. 326 U. S. 703 (1946).
33. FEDERAL INcoim, GisT AND ESTATE TAXATON (1944) 3416.
34. 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 692 (1941).
35. Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314
U. S. 691 (1941).
36. Price v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
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taxable on the income if the beneficiaries are within an intimate family
group, even though there exist no powers of administrative control, and
that he may also be taxable although there is present no factor of family
beneficiary, but there does exist an important power of administrative
control. Even in these cases the Treasury, in fixing as a short term any
term within ten years, is skirting along the outside limits mentioned by
the courts. But these deductions are a far cry from Regulations which
hold taxable to the grantor the income of a trust of less than 10 years'
duration in which there is a reversionary interest, but where there exists
no factor of family beneficiary and no element of administrative control:
Such provisions appear far to transcend the bounds of judicial sanction.
In the Barbour case the Court observed that "to formulate a predictable
rule for the taxation of grantors who set up trusts in their property
for short terms and retain the reversion is far from easy." It would
seem that the Treasury has somewhat oversimplified the task.
As long as the family-beneficiary factor of the Clifford case was-recog-
nized, it was logical, if a charity were the beneficiary of a short-term
trust, to hold the grantor not taxable on the income. Such, in fact, was
the distinction drawn in the charity-beneficiary cases,3 7 but once the
family-beneficiary factor is discarded, as in the Regulations, it would
appear that policy rather than logic dictates the basis for the exception
whereunder, in the case of trusts of less than 15 years' duration, of
which Sec. 23(o) organizations 38 are the sole beneficiaries, the grantor
is not taxable even if he reserves powers of administrative control.39
Attribution to One Spouse of Administrative Powers of Other. In the
case of trusts with reversionary interests in the grantor, and which have
a duration of less than 15 years, the Regulations provide for the taxa-
bility of the grantor if certain administrative controls reside solely either
in "the grantor, or spouse living with the grantor or both, whether or
not exercisable as trustee". Is there any judicial sanction for attributing
37. In the Chamberlain case, the Court found a substantial difference between that and
the Clifford case ".... where there was a family purpose trust . . .", and in the Pierce case,
the Court observed that ". . . the trust here was not a mere temporary allocation of
family income among the members of an intimate family group ... "
38. I. R. C. Sec. 23(o) describes the religious, charitable, educational, etc., organizations
herein referred to generally as "charities," contributions to which are deductible for income
tax purposes.
39. The Regulations provide for taxability of the grantor "... if the income is or may
be payable to a beneficiary other than a donee described in section 23(o) .... " (Italics
supplied.) Accordingly, if, as in the Lamont case, the trust income were to be distributed
". .. in the discretion of the trustees among specified charitable institutions and indi-
viduals . . .", the grantor would, under the Regulations, be taxable even though in fact
the trustees distributed the income to corporations which qualified under Sec. 23(o).
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to the husband the administrative powers of the wife with whom he
lives?
In Hormel v. Helvering," the Court indicated that the power of the
grantor and his wife to remove a co-trustee, and thus control the trust,
was tantamount to such power in- the grantor, and, borrowing a phrase
from the Clifford case, said that to hold otherwise "would be to treat
the wife as a complete stranger", and not to recognize "the normal
consequences of family-solidarity". To Mr. De Wind it "seems not
impossible... that the (Hormel) decision may point to ultimate general
disregard of a wife's powers of control on the basis of family solidarity."'
In the Barbour case,' the Court was dealing with a 6-year trust of
which the grantor's attorneys were the trustees with wide investment
powers, and, other Clifford case elements being present, observed that
"the selection of the grantor or his wife as trustees would beyond a
peradventure have resulted in his taxation", while in the Elias case'
the same Court, having before it a 6y 2 -year trust, concluded that a
settlor's lawyers are no more likely to be amenable to his wishes than a
husband to his wife's." In Altmaier v. Commissioner,4 the wife was
the co-beneficiary with children in trusts set up by the husband. The
husband and wife acting jointly could terminate the trusts at any time.
The Court held that the wife was not a person "having a substantial
adverse interest", and that its conclusion flowed from the Clifford con-
cept of "the normal consequences of family solidarity".
The contrary point of view was expressed by the Seventh Circuit in
Commissioner v. Katz et al., in which a wife had an interest in a trust,
and the wife and husband had joint power to terminate it at any time.
The Board held that the wife had a substantial adverse interest, and
the Court affirmed. The Commissioner invoked the Clifford doctrine
of the family economic unit, but the Court, while. admitting that the
contention "presents a close question", was not persuaded that the
Board's findings should be upset.4"
The Tax Court leaves no room for doubt as to its views. In Lillian
M. Newman,47 it said that
40. 312 U. S. 552 (1941).
41. De Wind, op. cit. supra note 9 at 837.
42. 122 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 691 (1941).
43. 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 692 (1941).
44. 116 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 706 (1941).
45. 139 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943).
46. To the same effect, see Commissioner v. Betts, 123 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941):
"It may be that because of family affection they (mother and wife of grantor) might
consent to a revocation but that fact does not of itself destroy their quality of adverse
holding".
47. 1 T. C. 921 (1943).
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"the Commissioner argues that because of the doctrine of family solidarity,
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, the husband should not be regarded as
having a substantial adverse interest. Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 Fed. (2d)
162. We have heretofore rejected such an argument. Estate of Frederick S.
Fisk, 45 B. T. A. 120, 123; Estate of Edward Lathrop Ballard, 47 B. T. A.
784, 792; Stephen Hexter, 47 B. T. A. 483, 491; James G. Heaslet, 47 B. T. A.
1006, 1010; Meyer Katz, 46 B. T. A. 187, 194-195; Jane B. Shiverick, 37
B. T. A. 454. Our view was, and is, that the Clifford case does not mean that
a person with an otherwise adverse interest will, solely by reason of marital
relationship, act In accordance with the wishes of his or her spouse."
It is unrealistic to assume that a wife, not adversely affected, would
not observe the wishes of her husband with respect to the administration
of a trust. Consequently, a husband should not be permitted to insulate
himself against tax liability resulting from the existence of an adminis-
trative power by reason of the circumstance that the power resided not
in him but in his wife. The courts have given wide scope to the Clifford
concept of family solidarity, and have stressed the need of a "rule of
thumb". It does not seem likely that they would challenge so much
of the Treasury Regulations; 4" but it is equally unrealistic not to recog-
nize an actual adverse interest wherever it exists, even in a family, and,
therefore, when in fact a spouse of the grantor has such an interest, it
would seem that the Treasury's argument that a power in such spouse
is tantamount to a power in the grantor, would generally fall upon
deaf judicial ears.
Power to Vote and Power to Control Investments. If a grantor of a
trust of less than 15 years' duration in which he has a reversionary
interest has the power, even as trustee, to vote stock or to control invest-
ments, he is, under the Regulations, taxable on the income. Perhaps in
the case of a short-term trust a presumption should not be recognized
that powers possessed by the grantor-trustee are exercisable primarily
for the benefit of the beneficiary. On the other hand, it would seem an
unduly harsh rule, and one which has no judicial support, to preclude
the grantor-trustee from showing that such powers were in fact so
exercisable. The latter is the rule which the Treasury lays down. If such
48. Cf. Ward Wheelock, 7 T. C. -, No. 14 (June 12, 1946) in which the Court, with
four dissents, held dividend income not taxable- to the grantor of a long-term trust which
held shares of a family-owned corporation. The grantor's wife had the power in her
individual capacity to designate who should vote the stock, and exercised this power in
favor of the grantor during the taxable years. The majority refused to base ownership
on "rightful expectations" or "undoubted assurance" of the husband as to the subservience
of the wife. However, it should be noted that the beneficiaries were the children of
grantor and his wife, and, as the Court pointed out, " . . . her interest in the welfare of
her children . . . may not be said to be less than his."
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a grantor has no power other than to vote stock, or if he has no power
other than tQ control investments, he is taxable.4 9 Each of these is a
normal trust power.J°
In Helvering v. Fuller,"' the Court had before it a 10-year trust for
the grantor's wife. The grantor retained exclusive voting power over
stocks constituting the corpus of the trust which, plus the shares owned
by the grantor, constituted more than a majority of the total voting
stock. While the Court did not pass upon the applicability of the
Clifford rule (the point not having been considered in the lower courts
or briefed or argued in the Supreme Court), it took occasion to observe
that the grantor "did retain considerable control over the trusteed
shares" and that the trust agreement might have left him "with sufficient
interest in or control over the trust as to make him the owner of the
corpus for purposes of the federal income tax. Helvering v. Clifford,
supra."
Archibald G. Bush 2 involved trusts of less than 3 years' duration
set up for the benefit of the grantor's wife and for that of his sister
"for whose support he felt responsible". The corpus consisted of stock
of a corporation of which the grantor was vice president, a member of
the board of directors, and a substantial stockholder. The trustee had-
no power to change the corpus of the trust without the donor's consent.
The Board held the donor taxable under the, Clifford doctrine.
In Williamson v. Commissioner, 3 the grantor was held taxable upon
the income of a long-term trust for the benefit of his wife and child,
where he had a substantial amount of control which included both the
right to vote stock and the right to direct investments. The stock involved
was that of a corporation of which he was president, and in which he
owned a very substantial interest. Of this decision it was said in Miller
v. CommissioneZ4 that "the Court of Appeals... somewhat reluctantly,
49. Even though these powers were not specifically reserved, the result would be the
same if, as in Funsten v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), the grantor
reserved the right "to change or modify any of the administrative provisions" of the trust.
50. Under the Regulations, the power to control investments is broadly stated. It may
be "by directing investments or reinvestments or, by vetoing proposed investments or
reinvestments". In Frank E. Wolcott, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940), A. 1941-1 C. B. 11 -the
Board distinguished between a grantor's right to direct investments by a corporate trustee
and his right to disapprove guggested investments by such trustee, which latter vas
thought, under the circumstances, "a very reasonable reservation".
51. 310 U. S. 69 (1940).
52. 43 B. T. A. 535 (1941), aff'd 123 F. (2d) 242 (C. C. A. 8th; 1941).
53. 132 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A 7th, 1942)
54. 147 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945). Settled on "no deficiency" stipulation Memo.
Op., Dkt. No. 3069 (Feb. 19, 1946).
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it would seem, affirmed the decision of the Board" that the grantor was
taxable.
In Edison v. Commissioner,5 5 the grantor as sole trustee of long-term
trusts set up for the benefit of his son and daughter had "full and plenary
powers of investment such as he would possess if he were the absolute
owner of the 'trust estate' in his private individual capacity", powers
"far beyond the scope of traditional fiduciary concept and function".
As sole trustee, he also had power to vote the stock. The trust assets
consisted almost wholly of stock of a company of which he was presi-
dent, director and a large stockholder. The Tax Court ruled: "Control
of the trust stock, together with that which he continued to hold indi-
vidually, may well have been of supreme importance to his economic
welfare", and the Circuit Court felt constrained to say that the Tax
Court's appraisal of such powers in the light of the relationship of
father-grantor and son and daughter beneficiaries, when added to the
donor's general scheme of family economics, made a rational finding
that under the Clifford doctrine the grantor was taxable on the trust
income.
In Kohnstamm v. Pedrick5 6 the Court said, in relation to a grantor's
reservation of a right to vote trusteed shares:
"One or two courts have considered it a revelant circumstance that the settlor
-either as trustee, or having power over the trustee-was a high official in
a company, a controlling number of whose shares were in the fund; but
they have merely counted it as one of many factors which taken together
kept the 'ownership' in the settlor, and we have no way of knowing how much
it weighed in their conclusion."
United States v. Pierce7 involved a trust of less than 10 years' dura-
tion of which a charity was the beneficiary. The donor reserved the
right to approve of investments of principal. In holding the grantor
non-taxable on the income, the Court observed that the
"right reserved by the settlor to approve the securities in which the trustee
might invest the trust principal was retained to protect her right of reversion,
and had nothing to do with the operation of the trust."
55. 148 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 721 (1945).
56. 153 F. (2d) 506 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). One of the factors in this case was the
reserved right of the grantor-trustee to vote stock of a company in which he was other-
wise interested. A similar power was present in Cushman v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d)
510 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). In neither case was-the grantor held taxable on the income.
However, both were long-term trusts. In both cases the Government has announced that
it will not appeal. In John Stuart, 2 T. C. 1103 (1943), A. 1944 C. B. 27, which also
involved a long-term trust, the investment-control factor was definitely rejected as a
basis of taxation of the grantor.
57. 137 F. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
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Thus, in the Fuller case in which, through a reservation of a power
to vote, the Court indicated that the grantor might have been taxable,
and in the Bush, Williamson and Edison cases, in which the grantor
was held taxable, the trust corpus consisted of stocks of corporations
wherein the grantor, individually, had a substantial interest apart from
the trust, and it may be added that the income beneficiaries were within
an intimate family group. No useful purpose would be served-by a
discussion of the numerous cases in which there existed a power to vote,
or a power to control investments, along with other administrative
powers or powers over beneficial enjoyment, since there is no means
of measuring the weight to be attached to each particular fagot in the
"bundle of rights". 8 If a reservation of a power to vote or to control
investments results in a substantial economic benefit to the grantor, such
power might, as in the Fuller case, when added to the brevity of the
term and the grantor's reversionary interest therein, be sufficient to
constitute practical ownership and thus render the grantor taxable; but
this theory would require due appraisal of the facts and circumstances
surrounding each of such cases-a difficulty which the Regulations solve
by ignoring.
Power to Reacquire Trust Corpus. Another power, the presence of
which renders taxable the grantor of a less than 15-year trust in which
he has a reversionary interest, is the power to "reacquire the trust
corpus by substituting other property, whether or not of an equivalent
value." In the Lamont case, 9 the grantor of a one-year trust was held
taxable on the income thereof, having reserved "the power to withdraw
any of the securities held in trust upon substituting others of equivalent
value." Although, as already noted, the Court later stated in the Hyman
case that the most important single factor in the Lamont case was a
wholly different power, namely, the indirect power which the grantor
reserved to shift beneficial interests, the Third Circuit, dealing with a
3-year trust, distinguished the Bok from the Lamont case by the cir-
cumstance that in the former there was no reserved power to withdraw
and substitute securities, which power, the Court observed,
"certainly shows continuous control by the settlor. Certainly such control is
one of the important attributes of ownership."
Neither of these cases related to a close family-beneficiary. It would
thus appear that in the case of a short-term trust with reversionary
58. Among the most recent cases on this point are Lillian R. Chertoff et al., 6 T. C.
266 (1946); Verne Marshall, 1 T. C. 442 (.1943) and Lorenz Iversen, 3 T. C. 756 (1944).
See also Ellis H. Warren, 45 B. T. A. 379 (1941), aff'd 133 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 6th,
1942); Followed in Leslie H. Green, 7 T. C. -, No. 34 (June 28, 1946).
59. 127 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
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interest in the grantor, there is considerable judicial support for the
provision of the Regulations under which a grantor is held taxable who
reserves the right to reacquire trust corpus through the substitution
process; but whether the existence of such a power would be sufficient
to tip the scales in favor of taxability in the case of any trust of less
than 15 years' duration with reversionary interest in the grantor, still
remains open to judicial determination. In a trust for the lives of
beneficiaries the reservation of a right to withdraw the corpora upon
substitution of securities of equal value was held not determinative of
grantor's taxability. °
Powers "Wkick May Reasonably be Expected" to Become Effective
Witkin Specified Period. The Regulations provide for the taxability
of a grantor who has a reversionary interest in a trust, not only when
such interest will, but also when it "may reasonably be expected" to,
take effect in possession or enjoyment within a specified 10 or 15-year
period, as the case may be; and further provides that the expiration
of such period may result not only from the passage of time, but also
from the happening of some specified event which is its "practical
equivalent".6 ' It would not seem to be essential to a short-term trust
within the Clifford rule that the trust expire by the passage of years.
The tax effects should be precisely the same if it were to terminate on
the happening of an event which would be the practical equivalent of
the specified term. However, the indefiniteness of the phrase, "may
reasonably be expected", leaves considerable play for administrative
interpretation. The Regulations furnish two examples:
The first is that of a trust the reversionary interest in which becomes
effective on the death of a person whose life expectancy was six years
when the property was conveyed to the trust. The Regulations hold
the grantor of such a trust taxable on its income. If the implication
is that the Treasury will employ mortality tables to determine the
period of a trust when measured by a life, then the income of every
trust with reversionary interest in the grantor, which by its provisions
is to terminate upon the death of a man, say, 60-62 years old when
the trust was created, and whose life expectancy, therefore, was less
than 15 years, would be taxable to the grantor if he retained any one
of the three specified administrative powers. In the event that the
60. John Stuart, 148 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 721 (1945).
61. The Regulations refer to ". . . the practical equivalent of the expiration of a period
less than of equal to 10 or 15 years. . . " By reason of the phrase, "or equal to", the
provision with respect to the term of a trust which expires through the happening of a
specified event is made inconsistent with the provision with respect to the terms of trusts
which expire by the passage of time "within 10 years" or "within 15 years".
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Treasury so applied its Regulations, it is doubtful whether it could
count on judicial support. At any rate, no case has come to the writer's
attention which would sustain such a rule.
The second example is that of a trust which is to revert to the grantor
or his estate "on the graduation from college or prior death of his son",
who, when the transfer to the trust was made, was 18 years of age.
Accepting the illustration at its face value, the happening of such an
event might or might not be the practical equivalent of the expiration
of a term of less than ten years, since "graduation from college or prior
death" are not mutually exclusive occurrences.
The Regulations further state that if a reversionary interest is to
become effective in the event that the grantor survives "any stated
contingency which is of an insubstantial character", it will be treated
as an interest which "may reasonably be expected" to take effect within
10 or 15 years, as the case may be, and here the illustration is that
of a grantor of a 3-year trust to whom corpus is to be returned if he
survives this brief period, otherwise to be paid to his wife. Again, the
term, "stated contingency . . . of an insubstantial character", leaves
an open field for departmental interbretation. The principle would
seem to be sound. Its application by the.Treasur'y may or may not be.
Finally, the Regulations provide that if the date.when the reversionary-
interest becomes effective is deferred, such postponement is tantamount
to the creation of a new trust to commence on the date when the post-
ponement becomes effective, and to terminate on the date prescribed.
Income which would not be taxed to the grantor for any period in the
absence of a postponement is not taxed to him during such period by
reason thereof. Both of these are logical and acceptable provisions.
II
Power to Dispose of Beneficial Enjoyment
Subject to specified exceptions, the Treasury lays down the general
rule that income of a trust is taxable to the grantor if he has a power
to dispose of the beneficial enjoyment of income or corpus. He is also
taxable if another party not having a substantial adverse interest has
such power, or if he and such other party have such power. For the
purpose of the general rule, it appears that the spouse living with the
grantor is not necessarily to be regarded as a person not having a sub-
stantial adverse interest. The power exists irrespective of the duration
of the trust, whether or not there is a reversionary interest, whether
the power is exercisable by revocation, alteration or otherwise, irre-
spective of the capacity in which the person possessing the power may
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act, and without regard to whether its exercise is contingent upon a
preceding giving of notice or limited to some future date.62 It is, how-
ever, provided that a broadly stated power to allocate receipts as be-
tween corpus and income is not deemed to be a power over beneficial
enjoyment.
The general rule that a grantor of a trust may be taxable on the
income if he has the power to shift at will the beneficial enjoyment
of such income or of the corpus, even though he personally does not
thereby benefit, is not now open to serious question. Such a power is
so important an attribute of ownership that the grantor may, for tax
purposes, fairly be regarded as the owner, and this view has substantial
judicial support.' To avoid practical nullification of the rule, it also
appears to be sound to provide for the same result, whether the power
resides in the grantor or in some other person not having a substantial
adverse interest. The difficulty arises in making provision for appro-
priate exceptions.
The only instances in which, under the Regulations, the foregoing
rule has no application are those as to which the taxation of income is
governed by Sec. 167(c) (relating to discretionary payments of trust
income for support or maintenance), and those embraced within any
one of the five following exceptions:
ExCEPTION 1. Power Exercisable by Will. If the power to control
the beneficial enjoyment of income or corpus is exercisable only by will,
then the income of a trust is not taxable to the grantor unless under the
power the grantor may appoint income accumulated for such disposition
by the grantor, or income which may be so accumulated in the discre-
tion of the grantor, or any person not having a substantial adverse
interest in the disposition of such income, or both. The exception itself
requires no comment. No case has been found wherein a grantor has
been held taxable on the income of a long-term trust if the only retained
62. Consistent with the provisions relating to the taxation of the grantor on income
of a trust the reversionary interest of which becomes effective within 10 years, or within
15 years if specified administrative controls exist, the Regulations with reference to taxa-
tion of grantors of trusts wherein there is a power to dispose of beneficial enjoyment
contain detailed provisions with respect to the tax effects of such powers if such beneficial
enjoyment becomes effective for a period commencing 10 or more years from the date
of the transfer, or, if specified administrative powers are retained, 15 or more years from
such date; and when the measure of the period after which the beneficial enjoyment
becomes effective is not a term of years but the happening of an event, the provisions are
consistent with those which relate to administrative control. Here again, therefore, mor-
tality tables, objection to which has already been noted, may play a part.
63. Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 131 F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 767 (1943); Littel v.
Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
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power was that to appoint by will income not accumulated for such
disposition by him, nor in the discretion of any person not having a
substantial adverse interest. The exception to the exception, namely, a
case in which a grantor is taxable for the reason that, although the only
retained power is that to appoint by will, the income subject to the power
has been accumulated for such purpose by him or in the discretion
of a non-adverse party, has the support of the Board in Reginald B.
Parsons64 and Stanley J. Klein. 5 To the contrary is Commissioner v.
Bateman,66 in which the trust provided for the accumulation of 5% of
the annual income, and the grantor reserved a power of appointment
over such income. The Court held the grantor nontaxable, but the ruling
was, in the language of the Court, "not without some misgivings". It
would seem that such misgivings were not without foundation. It is
difficult to find a reason why a grantor should not be taxed on income
accumulated by him for disposition under his will.
EXCEPTION 2. Power to Shift Beneficial Enjoyment Among Charities.
If the power to control the beneficial enjoyment of the income or corpus
consists only of a power to determine such enjoyment with respect
to income or corpus irrevocably dedicated to organizations qualifying
under Sec. 23(o), the income is not on thai account taxable to the
grantor. This rule is a recognition by the Treasury of the decision of
the Eighth Circuit in the Pierce case67 in which the grantor was held
not taxalile on the income of a trust which provided that such income
should be paid to or for religious, charitable, benevolent and educational
organizations and purposes, and which reserved to the grantor power
to amend the trust terms.
"only to 'such extent and for such purposes as may hereafter appear reason-
ably necessary or advisable in order to fully carry out the religious, charitable
and educational purposes' for which the trust was created."
As already indicated,68 the logic of providing an exception with respect
to any of these institutions would seem to flow from a premise which
the Treasury denies.
EXCEPTION 3. Power to Accumulate Income. If the power to con-
trol the beneficial enjoyment of the income or corpus consists only of
a power which enables the grantor or another person to distribute or
apply income to or for a current income beneficiary, or to accumulate
64. 44 B. T. A. 1142 (1941), A. 1941-2 C. B. 10.
65. 4 T. C. 1195 (1945), aff'd 154 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 3d, 1946), cert. denied, June 10,
1946.
66. 127 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942).
67. 137 F. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
68. See note 39 supra.
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such income for him, the grantor is not taxable provided that any
accumulated income is ultimately payable (a) to the beneficiary from
whom distribution or application is withheld, or, (b) if payable either
upon termination of the trust or in -conjunction with a distribution of
corpus augmented by such accumulated income, is ultimately payable
to the current income beneficiaries, in shares which have been irre-
vocably specified in the trust instrument. Accumulated income is con-
sidered so payable although it is provided that if any beneficiary does
not survive the date of distribution, his share is to be paid to a desig-
nated alternate taker, other than the grantor or his estate. In that
event, however, the share of such alternate taker must be irrevocably
specified in the trust instrument and the distribution date must reason-
ably be expected to occur within the -beneficiary's lifetime.
In providing this exception the Treasury follows a group of decisions
in which the courts refused to tax grantors who had reserved the right
to accumulate income, where the power was so limited that the bene-
ficiary from whom income was withheld would receive it on a date of
distribution which might reasonably be expected to occur within his
lifetime. 9 Conversely, the Treasury also adopts the rule of another
group of cases in which !he grantor had been held taxable where the
reserved power was so extensive that the beneficiary from whom distri-
bution was withheld might never have received it." Although such cases
would seem to present an array of judicial support for the Regulations,
the grantor of a trust has in other instances escaped taxation despite
the existence of so broad a reserved power to accumulate that the
income might never reach the beneficiary from whom it was withheld.71
69. Jones v. Norris, 122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941); David L. Loew, 7 T. C. -,
No. 43 (July 12, 1946); Standish Backus Est. 6 T. C. -, No. 132 (May 19, 1946),
A. 1946-17-12372 (as to separate trusts); W. L. Taylor, 6 T. C. 201, (1946), A. 1946-12-
12326; Alma M. Myer, 6 T. C. 77 (1946), A. 1946-10-12306; J. M. Leonard et al.,
4 T. C. 1271 (1945), A. 1945-16-12105; David Small, 3 T. C. 1142 (1944), A. 1944 C. B.
25; Lura Morgan, 2 T. C. 510 (1943), A. 1944 C. B. 20.
70. Sinopoulo v. Jones, 154 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 10th, 1946); Edison v. Commis-
sioner, 148 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 721 (1945); Funsten
v. Commisisoner, 148 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945); Stockstrom v Commissioner, 148
F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 719 -(1945); Miller v. Commis-
sioner, 147 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945); Warren v. Commissioner, 133 F. (2d) 312
(C. C. A. 6th, 1942); Williamson v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942);
Standish Backus Est., 6 T. C. -, No. 132 (May 19, 1946), A. 1946-17-12372 (as to
combined trust); Harold F. Jones et iux., 6 T. C. -, No. 54 (Mar. 11, 1946); Lillian
R. Chertoff et al., 6 T. C. 266 (1946); V. U. Young et al., 5 T. C. 1251 (1945); Anna
Morgan et al., 5 T. C. 1089 (1945); Ben F. Hopkins, 5 T. C. 803 (1945); Alex McCutchin
et ux., 4 T. C. 1242 (1945), A. 1945-22-12163, Lura Morgan, 2 T. C. 510 (1943),'A. 1944
C. B. 20.
71. Commissioner v. Katz, 139 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943); Phipps v. Commis-
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In the cases holding taxable a grantor having the power to accumu-
late income, and in which the accumulations might never be distributed
to the beneficiary from whom withheld, it must be observed that other
controls over income or corpus were reserved. Under the Regulations,
on the contrary, a non-excepted power to accumulate is of itself suffi-
cient to require taxing the grantor. In the Stuart case,72 the Supreme
Court voiced the opinion that the power to accumulate trust income is
not alone sufficient to make the income taxable to the grantor. In that
case the beneficiaries from whom income could be withheld might never
have received the accumulations. Speaking of this power, the Court
said: "So broad a basis would tax to a father the income of a simple
trust with a disinterested trustee for the benefit of his adult child. No
act of Congress manifests such an intention."
In the Stockstrom case,73 the Circuit Court, in affirming the Tax
Court, said:
"Whether the control of corpus or the power to dispose of income in the
present case was such as might create taxability against the petitioner on either
ground separately, we need not pause to consider, for the Tax Court rested
its decision, not upon one of the grounds singly, but upon the combination of
the two grounds that existed in the situation. 7 4
Contrariwise, where the power of accumulation was accompanied
only by such powers of management as were ordinary to a trustee, both
the Circuit Court' and the Tax Court76 have held the grantor not
taxable.
The Regulations further exceed judicial sanction in providing that a
non-excepted power 'of accumulation requires taxation of the grantor
whether the power resides in the grantor or with any person not having -
a substantial adverse interest. In the cited cases in which the grantor
was held taxable, the power resided in the grantor either in his indi-
vidual or fiduciary capacity." Indeed, in the McCutchin case,7S in which
sioner, 137 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); I. A. Wyant, 6 T. C. -, No. 72 (Mar. 25,
1946), A. 1946-12-12326; Donald S. Black, 5 T C. 759 (1945); Alex McCutchin et ux.,
4 T. C. 1242 (1945), A. 1945-22-12163; Robert S. Bradley, 1 T. C. 566 (1943), A. 1943
C. B. 3; Frederick Ayer, 45 B. T. A. 146 (1941), N A. 1943 C. B. 27.
72. 317 U. S. 154 (1942).-
73. 148 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 719 (1945).
74. See also Funsten v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A. Sth, 1945); Ben F.
Hopkins, 5 T. C. 803 (1945).
75. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 152 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
76. Donald S. Black, 5 T. C. 759 (1945).
77. See Cory v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. denied, 117
U. S. 642 (1942); Compare Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942),
with Price v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942), both involving a suc-
cession of short-term trusts.
78. 4 T. C. 1242 (1945).
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the income of the trusts for the parents was taxed to the grantor, the
power to accumulate was in a corporate trustee, and as a basis for
finding the grantor taxable the Tax Court was at pains to indicate
that the trustee was the alter ego of the settlor. In the Black case,7
in which the grantor was held nontaxable, although the accumulations
might never be distributed to the beneficiary, the power of accumulation
was in the grantor as trustee. In its opinion, the Tax Court said:
"If the petitioner had not become trustee of the trust here in question, we
do not think that any contention could validly be made that he was taxable
upon the income of the trust; for he retained no power to control the trustee."
To similar effect is the Bradley case,80 in which the grantor was not
taxed where the power of accumulation resided in the trustee, who
during the taxable years involved, was, successively, the grantor's law-
year, broker and bookkeeper. Further support for the proposition illus-
trated by the Black and Bradley cases is found both in the Hawkins
case,"' in which the Circuit Court pointed out that the settlor was not
the trustee, and in the above quoted language of the Supreme Court
in the Stuart case.
EXCEPTION 4. Power to Pay Corpus to Income Beneficiary. The
fourth exception to the general rule that a power to control beneficial
enjoyment of income or corpus renders the grantor taxable, relates to
power to invade principal. If either the grantor or anyone else has the
power to make payment of corpus to or for a current income beneficiary,
such power does not render the grantor taxable, provided either that
any such payment is chargeable against the proportionate share of
corpus held for such income beneficiary, or that such power is limited
by, "some reasonably definite external standard." If, therefore, there
is but a single income beneficiary,- or if there are several income bene-
ficiaries and the principal held for each is divided into shares or held
"as if such corpus constituted a separate trust", it is not necessary that
there be an external standard in order to relieve the grantor of tax lia-
bility. The standard to which the Regulations refer must be set forth
in the trust instrument, consist of the needs and circumstances of the
beneficiaries, and "be susceptible of enforcement by a court of equity."
Instances in which a reasonably definite external standard are held by
the Treasury to be lacking are cases in which there may be paid out
of principal "such amounts as the trustee shall determine wise and
proper in the exercise of his honest discretion", or "such amounts as
79. 5 T. C. 759 (1945).
80. 1 T. C. 566 (1943).
81. 152 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
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the trustee determines to be in the best interests of the beneficiaries".
In ruling that a grantor is not taxable by reason of the circumstance
that he has power to invade principal for payments to an income bene-
ficiary, the Treasury is adopting the rule established by such cases as
Jones v. Norris," in which the grantor of a long-term trust was held
nontaxable on the income, although he had reserved the right during
his lifetime to direct the trustee to make settlement either in full or in
part with any one of the beneficiaries who had attained the age of
twenty-one years. The trusts involved were separate trusts for each of
the grantor's children, and any payment of corpus directed under the
reserved power was chargeable against the share held in trust for the
payment of income to the' beneficiary. The foregoing principle was
recently followed in I. A. Wyants in which the grantor was held non-
taxable as to the income of a trust for an adulf son to whom he might
make advances which would reduce the corpus held in trust for the
payment of income to such son. The trust instrument under considera-
tion in the Hall case 4 is a practical illustration of a case which meets
the external standard test. There the trustee was empowered
"to expend from the principal or income any sums reasonably necessary for
the education and maintenance of the beneficiaries, and for the 'purpose of
defraying the expense of illness, emergency or other extreme misfortune.'"
In Frederick Ayer 5 the trust instrument authorized the trustees, who
were the grantor and his wife, to pay to their son, the income beneficiary,
"so much of the principal as they deem necessary from time to time
for his maintenance and support". In Commisisoner v. Armours0 the
trustee was authorized to pay such part of the principal as might be
necessary for the "support, maintenance and comfort" of the income
beneficiary. Here, too, the grantor was held nontaxable. In these five
cases, however, it appears that under the Regulations the grantor would
have been nontaxable under the separate trust fund rule. 7
In providing for the nontaxability of the grantor of a trust in which
there is a power to invade principal for payment to an income beneficiary
for whom there is no separate trust fund, solely where the power is
limited by a "reasonably definite external standard", the Treasury
82. 122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
83. 6 T. C. -, No. 72 (Mar. 25, 1946); see also Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F. (2d)
506 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Standish Backus Est., 6 T. C. -, No. 132 (May 9, 1946),
A. 1946-17-12372.
84. Joel E. Hall v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
85. 45 B. T. A. 146 (1941), N. A. 1943 C. B. 27.
86. 125 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
87. See also Suhr v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
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seems to have proceeded without specific judicial support. The require-
ments that the "external standard" be "reasonably definite" and "sus-
ceptible of enforcement by a court of equity" are scarcely to be classified
as "precise guides". Where the power authorizes payment for "main-
tenance, education and support", it is clear that there is a "reasonably
definite external standard"; where the power authorizes payment merely
for "comfort" or "well being", it appears equally clear that such stand-
ard is lacking. But in many trusts there is coupled with the phrase,
"maintenance, education and support", such additions as "comfort",
"happiness" or "well being". In such instances it would appear that
the reasonably definite external standard has been met. Accordingly,
a clause in a trust instrument vesting a trustee with power to invade
principal for an income beneficiary's "maintenance, education, support
and comfort", to be exercised "as the trustee deems proper", or "in
his discretion", would not seem to make the power so subjective as to
fall short of a "reasonably definite external standard". 8
EXCEPTION 5. Power to Apportion Income Within Class of Bene-
ficiaries. The fifth and final exception to the general rule that a power
to control beneficial enjoyment of income or corpus renders the grantor
taxable is a case where there exists a power exercisable exclusively by a
trustee other than the grantor, or spouse living with the grantor, to
apportion income to or within a class of beneficiaries 0 if (a) the exer-
cise of the power is not subject to approval or consent of any person
other than the trustee, and (b) the power is limited by "some reasonably
definite external standard." The requirements of such standard are the
same for this as for the immediately preceding exception.
The provision making the exception inapplicable if the power is exer-
cised by a spouse living with the grantor appears inconsistent with
the holding of the Second Circuit in the Phipps case"0 in which the
88. The trust law on the subject is stated as follows: ". . . Thus where by the terms
of the trust he is directed to pay so much of the income or principal of the trust estate
to a beneficiary as is in the opinion of the trustee necessary for his support, or ,uain-
tenance, or comfort, the court will control the trustee if he acts beyond the bounds of a
reasonable judgment. . . . It is true that the standard is not a fixed standard, but the
trustee is guilty of an abuse of discretion if it appears to the court that he is paying
less than a reasonable person could think necessary for the beneficiary's support. So also
he may be guilty of an abuse of discretion where he pays the beneficiary more than could
reasonably be thought necessary for his support." (Italics supplied.) 2 ScoTT, THF LAW
OF TRUSTS (1939) § 187.2.
89. The term "class of beneficiaries" is susceptible of various interpretations. In the
law of wills and trusts, whether a gift is one to a class has been a frequently litigated
question. Cf. I. R. C. Sec. 811 (f) relating to powers of appointment in which the
excepted "class" is specifically defined.
90. Phipps v. Commissioner, 137 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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grantor's spouse was co-trustee with a trust company and the trustees
could, in their discretion, apportion income between the wife and the
child of the grantor. Accepting the finding of the Tax Court that the
corporate trustee was not independent, and that the situation must be
considered as if the grantor and his wife were the two trustees, the
Court nevertheless reversed the Tax Court and held that the grantor
was not taxable. In the opinion of the Court, it could not be conclusively
presumed that the wife, having a substantial adverse interest in the
income, Would exercise' her fiduciary powers in accordance with the
wishes of her husband?1
The proposition that a grantor is taxable on the income of a trust
if the right to apportion income within a class of beneficiaries is reserved
to himself in any capacity is in conflict with the decision of the Fifth
Circuit in Hawkins v. Commissioner.2 In that case, the grantor reserved
to himself, among other powers, the right to "alter or modify the pro-
visions of distributions as herein set forth to the beneficiaries." The
Court held the grantor nontaxable, and the Government announced that
it would not appeal. Supporting the Regulations is Lura H. Morgan,"
in ivhich the grantor-trustee, who had reserved the power to appoint
among her husband, nephews and nieces, was held taxable on the
income. 94
III
Power of Administrative Control Exercisable Primarily for
Grantor's Benefit
The Regulations provide that, irrespective of the duration of a trust,
the income thereof shall be taxable to the grantor if administrative
control is exercisable "primarily for the benefit of the grantor rather
than the beneficiaries of the trust." If the power is exercisable by a
person as trustee, the Regulations provide a presumption that it is
exercisable primarily in the interests of the beneficiary, and this is
subject to rebuttal "only by clear and convincing proof" that it is not
91. Commissioner v. Wooley, 122 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314
U. S. 693 (1941).
92. 152 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
93. 2 T. C. 510 (1943), A. 1944 C. B. 20.
94. For cases in which the power to appoint existed along with other powers, and in
which the grantor was held taxable, see Littel v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A.
2d, 1946); Steckel v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 4 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946); Funsten v.
Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945); George v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d)
837 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 778 (1944); Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F.
(2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Brown v. Commissioner, 131 F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. 3d,
1942), cert. denied, 318'U. S. 767 (1943).
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so exercisable. On the other hand, if the power is not exercisable by a
person as trustee, there is a presumption that it is exercisable in a
nonfiduciary capacity, which, however, may also be rebutted if it appears
"from all the terms of the trust and the circumstances surrounding its
creation and administration" that it is exercisable primarily in the
interests of the beneficiaries.
In the Clifford case, the Court said that the answer to the question
as to whether the grantor could be treated as the owner of the corpus
must depend upon an analysis "of the terms of the trust and all the
circumstances attendant on its creation and operation." (Italics sup-
plied.) In the Regulations the Treasury refers to the existence of
administrative control "under the terms of the trust or the circusmtances
attendant on its operation." (Italics supplied.) While it is true that
the "express provisions of the declaration of trust . . . must give way
before the realities of the situation",v' this provision suggests a fertile
field of potential claims.
The administrative control to which reference was made in relation
to short-term trusts, differs from that here under consideration in that
here such control is that which is "exercisable primarily for the benefit
of the grantor rather than the beneficiaries". The Regulations specify
four situations, and it would seem that they not merely illustrate but
comprise such administrative control.
Power to Sell for Less Than Full and Adequate Consideration. The
first situation is that in which a power is exercisable by the grantor, or
by any person lacking a substantial adverse interest in its exercise,
or both, and enables the grantor or any person to deal with or dispose
of the corpus or the income "for less than an adequate and full consid-
eration in money or money's worth" 6 The Regulations further provide
that the mere fact that a trustee's power is described in broad language
does not indicate that he is authorized to deal with or dispose of the
trust estate for less than such consideration, but that, on the other hand,
his authority might be indicated by the actual administration of the
trust. Where, as in Christopher L. Ward,"7 the trustee was required
to sell any investments representing principal of the estate "at such
price as may be directed by the Donor", and to exchange investments
"for others as may be directed by the said Donor", the grantor would,
under the Regulations, have such administrative control as to make
him taxable on the trust -income.
95. William J. Garland, 42 B. T. A. 324 (1940), A. 1941-1 C. B. 5.
96. The phrase, "an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" is
that of I. R. C. Sec. 811 (i) relating to estate taxes, and I. R. C. Sec. 1002 relating to gift
taxes.
97. 40 B. T. A. 225 (1939), rev'd. 119 F. (2d) 207 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
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Power to Borrow. The second situation is that in which a power is-
exercisable by (a) the grantor, (b) spouse living with the grantor, (c)
both (whether or not as trustee in any instance), (d) any other person
in a nonfiduciary capacity, (e) such person and either the grantor or
spouse, or (f) such person and both the grantor and spouse, which
enables the grantor to borrow trust funds. The Regulations cover both
direct and indirect borrowings, and apply whether there is or is not
adequate security or interest. It would seem that just as the Regula-
tions provide that the mere fact that a trustee has the power described
in broad language authorizing him to purchase and sell securities is not
indicative of .a power to sell for less than a full consideration, so, too,
the Regulations should have provided that a power in a grantor-trustee
to "Lend money with or without security", as in Alex McCutchin,9
is not indicative of a power to lend money to himself with or without
security. In Morss v. United States"0 the Court rejected the Govern-
ment's contention that a power reserved in broad terms permitting the
lending of trust funds to any person as the trustee-grantor might deter-
mine, allowed the grantor to benefit himself. The Court was of the
opinion that such power was fiduciary and necessary for trust
management.
Power to Borrow-Loan Repaid. The third situation is that in which
a power exercisable by a trustee, other than the grantor or spouse living
with the grantor, permits the grantor to borrow from the trust. Such a
power, however, does not constitute administrative control exercisable
primarily for the grantor's benefit if he, having borrowed from the trust,
completely repays the loan, including interest, before the beginning of
the taxable year. This provision, unlike the immediately preceding one,
makes no reference to the adequacy of the interest.
Power to Vote, Power to Control Investments, and Power to Reacquire
Trust Corpus. The fourth situation is that in which there exists any
of the three administrative powers which, in relation to short-term
trusts, have already been discussed. While the administrative powers
in short-term trusts related to powers exercisable solely by the grantor
or spouse living with the grantor, the powers here under consideration
are those exercisable by "any person in a nonfiduciary capacity". This
phrase would seem to include the grantor. In Ronald K. Evans,' the
Tax Court has recently held nontaxable a non-trustee grantor, who had:
retained the right to direct the investment of trust funds.'0 ' The Court
98. 4 T. C 1242 (1945)
99. 84 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1946).
100. Memo. Op., Dkt. No. 5510 (Jan. 31, 1946).
101. To same effect is David L. Loew, 7 T. C. -, No. 43 (July 12, 1946); see also
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was convinced that the retained power was exercisable for the benefit
of the beneficiaries.
The Treasury's omission to provide for a trust of which a charity is
the beneficiary presents an anomaly. If a grantor constitutes himself
sole trustee of a trust for the benefit of a charity, the trust to terminate
within 15 years, and the grantor has the right as trustee to vote stock
constituting corpus of the trust, he would not be taxable on the income;
but if he appoints another as trustee and reserves the same right, and
the trust is to last for 15 or more years, it would be presumed that he
was exercising the power primarily for his own benefit, and, unless he
could rebut the presumption, he would be taxable. Indeed, it is not
clear that he would not be taxable in the latter event, even if the trust
were for less than 15 years.
IV
Related Matters
Limitations of Regulations. Out of a superabundance of caution, the
Regulations provide that the grantor of a trust who directs the payment
of income in satisfaction of his own legal obligations continues to be
taxable on the income 0 2 They also provide that the grantor may be
taxable despite the limitations of the foregoing provisions if, by virtue
of some other principle of law, the income is attributable to him, for
example, on the theory that he had merely assigned income.
The Regulations further state that the foregoing provisions do not
"affect the applicability of section 22(a) to the creator of a family
partnership." -Indeed, such provisions do not in terms relate to the
applicability of Sec. 22 (a) to the income from an interest in any partner-
ship, family or otherwise, held in trust. Therefore, the extent to which
a grantor, who assigns a partnership interest to a trust, may retain
administrative control without incurring tax liability on the trust income
is a point on which the Treasury has not functioned. In Armstrong et al.
v. Commissioner,103 the grantor, without retaining any reversionary
interest, conveyed to himself as trustee for his children an interest in
a family partnership. The trust was to terminate in not more than
twelve years. The Tax Court'" held the grantor taxable under the
Clifford doctrine. In reversing, the Circuit Court stated that the grantor
Ward Wheelock, 7 T. C. -, No. 14 (June 12, 1946), (grantor not taxable despite power
in grantor's wife, in her individual capacity, to direct voting of stock); cf. M. Friedman,
7 T. C. -, No. 9 (June 10, 1946).
102. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
103. 143 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944).
104. 1 T. C. 1008 (1943).
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had no greater voice in the partnership management through the trust
than he had independently. On the other hand, the Tax Court, in
S. Kenneth Alexander,0 5 has recently held taxable a grantor who had
declared himself trustee of a trust set up for the benefit of his wife
to which he had conveyed an interest in a family partnership. The
trust was to terminate upon the death of the wife. The Court distin-
guished the Armstrong from the Alexander case on the ground that in
the latter there was not only a reversionary interest, but the grantor
had retained such complete control of the partnership business as to
constitute dominion substantially equivalent to full ownership. In the
light of the two Supreme Court decisions dealing with family partner-
ships,10 handed down since the promulgation of T. D. 5488, it is doubt-
ful whether a grantor under any circumstances may assign an interest
in a family partnership to a trust of which there is a family beneficiary,
without remaining taxable on the income.
10 7
It is provided that Sec. 22(a) "shall be applied in the determination
of the taxability of trust income for taxable years beginning prior to
January 1, 1946, without reference" to the Regulations as amended by
T. D. 5488, but in a separate ruling l it is provided that in cases not
finally determined for such years it will be the Bureau policy, where no
inconsistent claims prejudicial to the Government are asserted b?
trustees or beneficiaries, not to assert liability under the general provi-
sions of Sec. 22(a) if the trust income would not be taxable to the
grantor under the amendment to the Regulations.
Trust Income Taxable to Persons Other Than Grantor. The Regula-
tions provide that where someone other than the grantor has a power,
exercisable solely by himself, to possess corpus or income, he shall be
taxable on the income; and even though such power were so modified
that he himself could no longer receive the income or corpus, he still
remains taxable if he continues to have powers such as would subject
a grantor to tax on the income. But this provision has no application
to a power over income if, under the Regulations, the grantor is other-
wise taxable. It, too, affects in terms only taxable years beginning on
and after January 1, 1946, but may be retroactively applied under
Mim. 5968.
Gift Tax Considerations. It is not within the scope of this paper
to discuss the gift tax implications of the Clifford decision or of the
105. 6 T. C. -, No. 105 (Apr. 23, 1946).
106. Commissioner v. Tower, 326 U. S. 703 (1946); Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 326
U. S. 702 (1946).
107. See Lewis C. Benson, 6 T. C. -, No. 97 (Apr. 17, 1946).
108. Mim. 5968 I. R. B. 1946-2-12211.
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Treasury Regulations. Since the grantor of a trust which is within the
Clifford doctrine is "still in practical effect the owner of its income",
it has been suggested that in periodically relinquishing his rights to
such income he makes a taxable gift. However, just as it seems that
a forgiveness of a debt might be a gift within the meaning of Sec.
22 (b) (3), for the purpose of exempting the debtor from income taxes,
but not a "gift" under Sec. 1000 for the purpose of imposing a gift
tax on the grantor, so, too, it appears that a grantor may be deemed to
have made a legally effective and complete gift of property within the
meaning of Sec. 1000 and still remain the owner of the property for
purposes of Sec. 22 (a). As the Court observed in Helvering v. American
Dental Co.:109
"'Gifts', however, is a generic word of broad connotation, taking coloration
from the context of the particular statute in which it may appear."
Conclusion
T. D. 5488 serves a useful purpose. It is a definite studied statement
by the Treasury of its current views as to the scope of the Clifford
doctrine. It is, however, so far out of focus with judicial interpretation
that further litigation with piecemeal adjudications is inevitable. As
to the Tax Court and the various Circuit Courts, it seems likely that
each will continue to apply the Clifford principle according to its own
lights, whether or not in agreement with the Treasury. Indeed, presag-
ing general opposition to the Treasury's position, the Tax Court has
already held that the Regulations do not represent a correct interpreta-
tion of the statufe, stating that:
"the" mere change in . . . administrative construction of the Revenue Acts of
Congress, will not result . . . in the overruling of a line of decisions of this
Court which, to the present time, have the approval of the higher Courts.""n0
Congress placed a definite practical restriction"' on the rule of the
Stuart case.u What T. D. 5488 patently demonstrates is the urgent
need of similar action on the Clifford decision.
109. 318 U. S. 322 (1943).
110. Louis Stockstrom Est., 7 T. C. -, No. 32 (June 27, 1946).
111. I. R. C. Sec. 167 (c), as added by Sec. 134, Revenue Act of 1943.
112. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
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